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ROBBING THE CORPORATE GRAVE: CERCLA 
LIABILITY, RULE 17(b), AND POST-DISSOLUTION 
CAPACITY TO BE SUED 
Monica Conyngham" 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A federal judge must decide a case in which a corporation has 
violated federal pollution laws while making millions of dollars in 
profit. Thousands of tons of toxic chemicals have been dumped with 
no regard for potential injuries to the pUblic. After realizing how 
much the cleanup may cost, the corporation sells its assets, dissolves 
under state law, and distributes the profits from the sale to its 
shareholders. When the federal government seeks to recover re-
sponse costs for the cleanup of the site a few years later, attorneys 
for the corporation claim that it is no longer liable because it is 
legally dissolved, and its capacity to be sued has expired. 
In light of the recent public and legislative concern over hazardous 
waste exposure, at first glance the judge's decision might seem clear: 
impose liability on the· dissolved corporation for flagrant violation of 
the law. Although public policy underlying hazardous waste legisla-
tion would support this result, the current state of the law may not. 
The question of whether liability attaches to a dissolved corpora-
tion for hazardous waste cleanup under federal law has been raised 
in recent cases, but has not been decided uniformly. The dispute 
involves the clash between a federal statute and a federal rule of 
civil procedure, with underlying preemption conflicts between fed-
eral substantive law and state corporate law as well. 
* Solicitations Editor, 1989-90, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW RE-
VIEW. 
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The federal statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund),1 was 
passed by Congress in 1980 to address the problem of the then-
estimated 30,000 to 50,000 hazardous waste sites across the country.2 
The need for federal legislation grew out of increasing public concern 
over hazardous waste. This concern escalated with dramatic cases 
such as Love Canal and Valley of the Drums,3 and Congress accord-
ingly enacted a liability scheme designed to cast a wide net over 
corporate defendants. 
The rule that clashes with this liability scheme is Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 17(b),4 adopted in 1938. Rule 17(b) directs federal 
courts to defer to state corporate law to determine the capacity of a 
corporation to sue or be sued.5 Corporate capacity under state dis-
solution laws varies widely, from a two-year post-dissolution period 
in which claims may be brought to unending corporate liability. The 
question, therefore, is whether Rule 17(b) can permit state corporate 
law to trump CERCLA liability, and thereby cut a large hole in 
CERCLA's liability net. 
In Section II, this Comment explores the basic liability provisions 
of CERCLA and the courts' treatment of procedural and equitable 
defenses to CERCLA liability. Section III looks at the history of 
Rule 17(b) and federal courts' treatment of conflicts between state 
dissolution laws and federal statutes. Section IV examines conflicts 
between federal rules and federal statutes generally. Section V dis-
cusses CERCLA preemption of state corporate law on the question 
of dissolution, and reviews state dissolution laws and the Revised 
Model Business Act to examine the substantive areas of conflict with 
CERCLA. Section VI examines CERCLA cases that have ad-
dressed the problem of the liability of dissolved corporations to date, 
and the potential implications for hazardous waste cleanup. Because 
CERCLA's language and legislative history do not support reading 
the statute's liability provisions to reach dissolved corporations, in 
Section VII this Comment suggests that Congress review this issue 
and explicitly make dissolved corporations liable under CERCLA. 
1 CERCLA §§ 101~08, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982) (amended by Superfund Amendments 
and Reauthorization Act (SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (Supp. IV 1986)). 
2 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. 
3 [d., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6121. 
428 U.S.C. app. § 17(b) (1982). 
5 The Rule makes no distinction between a federal court sitting in diversity and a court 
hearing a federal question. [d. 
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II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, 
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY ACT 
A. The Statute and Its Legislative History 
857 
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 to address the problem of 
thousands of improperly managed hazardous waste sites in the 
United States. 6 Hazardous waste disposal at ongoing facilities was 
already covered by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA),7 but RCRA did not specifically address past actions at 
abandoned waste sites. 8 The purpose of CERCLA was twofold: (1) 
to establish a trust fund to provide monies needed to address im-
mediate threats to public health posed by these sites;9 and (2) to 
make those responsible for hazardous waste sites pay for the the 
costs of their cleanup. 10 
To achieve these two goals, Congress created a broad liability 
scheme designed to cast a wide net over individual and corporate 
defendants. Section 107(a) of CERCLA 11 provides that, subject to 
three limited defenses laid out in section 107(b) , 12 liability should be 
imposed on owners, operators, transporters, and generators of haz-
ardous waste posing a threat to public health "[n]otwithstanding any 
other provision or rule of law. "13 
6 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. For an overview of CERCLA's legislative history on liability, see 
Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982). See also United 
States V. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 805-08 (S.D. Ohio 1983); United States V. 
Reilly Tar and Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1111-12 (D. Minn. 1982). 
7 Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6901-699li (1982 & 
Supp. v 1987». 
8 See United States V. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1252 (S.D. Ill. 1984) (citing 
United States V. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (D. N.J. 1983». 
9 Monies from the fund are generated through general revenues and through a tax on petro-
chemicals. Hazardous Substances Response Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2797 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611-4672 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986». 
10 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 6119. 
11 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
12 [d. § 9607(b) (1982). The defenses are (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; and (3) a limited 
third-party defense. See Comment, The Practical Significance of the Third Party Defense 
Under CERCLA, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 383 (1988). 
13 Section 9607(a) of CERCLA provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the defenses 
set forth in subsection (b) of this section -
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, 
858 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:855 
Although this "notwithstanding" provision appears to create a net 
through which no defendant could escape, an examination of CER-
CLA's legislative history indicates that Congress did not intend to 
create an absolute liability standard. As finally passed, CERCLA 
represented a compromise between House and Senate bills. 14 The 
liability standard was one of the areas of strong disagreement among 
members of Congress,15 and language mandating joint and several 
liability contained in the Senate bill was removed from the final bill 
in order to secure the votes necessary for passage. 16 
The floor statements of CERCLA's chief sponsors comprise the 
Act's only real legislative history.17 Senator Randolph stated that he 
envisioned liability standards under CERCLA to be the same as 
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or 
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, 
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or 
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, 
of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or 
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or 
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and 
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to 
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, 
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence 
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for -
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian Tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency 
plan; 
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent 
with the national contingency plan; 
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including 
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such 
a release; and 
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under 
section 9604(i) of this title . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (Supp. IV 1986). 
,. H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1980). 
15 See 126 CONGo REC. S15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Helms, who led 
the opposition in the Senate). 
16 Some Senators, including Senator Stafford, a chief sponsor of the compromise, acknowl-
edged that "major concessions [would have to be made] in the final effort to achieve a 
Superfund bill this year." 126 CONGo REC. S14,967 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of 
Sen. Stafford). Removal of strict liability language was a major concession. See id.; 126 CONGo 
REC. S14,980 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Senator Cohen, who did not favor the 
compromise but supported it in order to ensure that some legislation was passed before the 
end of the session). For further discussion on this change of language, see Moore & Kowalski, 
When is One Generator Liable for Another's Waste?, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 93, 94-96 (1984-
85). 
17 House and Senate reports were prepared for CERCLA's predecessors, H.R. 7020 and S. 
1480, but no committee reports were prepared for the final bill, which never went through 
review at the committee level. 
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those under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,18 which he 
understood to be strict. 19 Unresolved issues of liability, he continued, 
should be "governed by traditional and evolving principles of com-
mon law. "20 Similarly, Representative Florio, the chief sponsor of 
the original House bill, stated that: "The terms joint and several 
have been deleted with the intent that ... liability ... be determined 
under common or previous statutory law . . . . "21 Thus, Congress 
expressed a policy of imposing liability without fault but left the 
determination of other liability issues to the courts. 
Some members of Congress also expressed a strong concern dur-
ing debate that liability be applied uniformly throughout the country 
to keep hazardous waste companies from moving their operations to 
states with more lenient laws. As Representative Florio stated dur-
ing the House debate of the bill: "To insure the development of a 
uniform rule of law, and to discourage business dealing in hazardous 
substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient laws, 
the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common 
law in this area."22 Nothing in CERCLA's legislative history, how-
ever, indicates any explicit consideration of potential conflicts with 
procedural or equitable defenses or with the particular issue of lia-
bility of a dissolved corporation. 
B. CERCLA Liability in the Federal Courts 
Under Congress's direction to let "traditional and evolving prin-
ciples of common law" govern unresolved liability issues, the courts 
have had to fill significant gaps regarding CERCLA liability. In this 
effort, courts have held that CERCLA, as a remedial statute, should 
be construed broadly to effect its purposes.23 Not surprisingly, CER-
CLA liability is imposed on a wide range of defendants. 24 In addition, 
the courts have held uniformly that CERCLA's purpose and struc-
18 FWPCA § 311, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1321 (West 1986 & Supp. 1988). 
19 126 CONGo REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
2fJ [d. 
21 126 CONGo REC. H11,787 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 1980) (statement of Rep. Florio). 
22. [d. 
23 United States V. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 192-96 (W.D. Mo. 1985) 
(holding that CERCLA, as a statute enacted for the protection of public health, is to be given 
"an extremely liberal construction") (quoting 3 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION § 71.02, at 313); United States V. Reilly Tar and Chern. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 
1100, 1112 (D. Minn. 1982). 
24 See Developments in Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1511-17, 1535-39 
(1987) (discussing CERCLA liability for owners, operators, generators, corporate officers, 
and third parties). 
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ture support the development of interstitial federal common law, 
rather than the adoption of state common law, to promote nationwide 
uniform liability standards. 25 For example, in United States v. Chem-
Dyne COrp.,26 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio noted the federal government's financial interest in 
protecting CERCLA's trust fund27 and held that a liability standard 
that varied from state to state would undermine CERCLA's policies 
by encouraging illegal dumping in states with lax liability laws. 28 
Courts also have held consistently that the language of the statute 
and the strong public interest in cleaning up abandoned sites support 
retroactive application of the statute. 29 Furthermore, courts have 
ruled that congressional removal of joint and several liability from 
CERCLA does not preclude the imposition of joint and several 
liability on a case-by-case basis.30 
1. Procedural Defenses Under CERCLA 
Despite the strong policy objectives in CERCLA, the "notwith-
standing" language, and the limited statutory defenses in section 
107(b), courts have not held that CERCLA's liability scheme excuses 
plaintiffs from meeting the requirements of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. As originally enacted, CERCLA had no provision 
authorizing nationwide service of process, and plaintiffs were thus 
bound by Rule 4(e).31 In cases where insufficient process has been 
raised as a defense, courts have not read the "notwithstanding" 
language to supersede Rule 4(e), but rather have held that CERCLA 
did not contain the language necessary to authorize nationwide ser-
25 See, e.g., United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1255-56 (S.D. Ill. 
1984); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1338-39 (E.D. Pa. 1983); United States v. 
Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802,808-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
26 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983). 
27 [d. at 808. CERCLA's trust fund, established through the collection of a tax on petro-
chemicals, is designed to fund emergency cleanups and cleanups at sites where the responsible 
party does not clean up, cannot be found, or does not have sufficient resources to pay for the 
cleanup. S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIA-
BILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at 320 (1983); see also Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 
(1986). 
28 Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 809. 
29 See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. and Chern. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732 (8th 
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. South Carolina Recycling and 
Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1753, 1760 (D.S.C. 1984). 
30 See, e.g., Chem-Dyne, 572 F. Supp. at 808; United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 
1337-38 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
31 28 U.S.C. app. 4(e) (1982). 
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vice. 32 Thus, defendants who might otherwise have been liable were 
not amenable to suit because of limitations imposed by a rule of civil 
procedure. 
Congress subsequently recognized that the original CERCLA leg-
islation needed clarification on this point. In 1986, Congress amended 
section 113 of CERCLA to explicitly authorize nationwide service 
of process. 33 House,34 Senate,35 and Conference reports36 for the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) all contain 
language indicating that this amendment was designed to clarify and 
confirm congressional intent in CERCLA, but the language of the 
amendment itself contains no such indication. 37 
This lack of "confirm and clarify" language in SARA, as well as 
the lack of clarity in CERCLA's legislative history, has been held 
to prevent a court from applying section 113 retroactively. In In re 
Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings,38 the United 
States District Court in Massachusetts refused to rejoin a corporate 
defendant who had been dismissed from a CERCLA action in part 
for lack of personal jurisdiction based on insufficient service of pro-
cess. 39 This case exemplifies how, even after further congressional 
clarification, at least one federal rule of civil procedure has shielded 
a defendant from liability under CERCLA because the plaintiff was 
unable to bring, or keep, the defendant in court. 
32 In re Acushnet River and New Bedford Harbor, 675 F. Supp. 22, 30 (D. Mass. 1987); see 
Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D.R.I. 1985). In a subsequent opinion, O'Neil v. 
Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706 (D.R.I. 1988), the district court reexamined the court's jurisdiction 
over the defendant in light of recent federal court decisions regarding minimum contacts. Id. 
at 726-27. But see United States v. Bliss, 108 F.R.D. 127, 137 (1985). 
In Bliss, the court found implicit nationwide service of process in CERCLA for abatement 
actions but not for cost-recovery actions. The court stated: "[S]ection [113b] does not alter 
traditional restraints upon the exercise of jurisdiction over the person. Thus, in cost-recovery 
actions, the district court must have personal jurisdiction and proper service of process in 
accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4." Bliss, 108 F.R.D. at 137. The Acushnet court flatly 
rejected the Bliss holding that found implicit nationwide service of process for abatement 
actions. Acushnet, 675 F. Supp. at 29. 
33 SARA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) (Supp. IV 1986). 
34 H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 79, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS 2835, 2861. 
35 S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 59. 
36 H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 221, 222, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 3276, 3314-15. 
37 Section 113(e) provides that "[i]n any action by the United States under this chapter, 
process may be served in any district where the defendant is found, resides, transacts business, 
or has appointed an agent for the service of process." SARA § 113(e), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(e) 
(Supp. IV 1986). 
38 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). 
39 Id. at 35-37. 
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2. Equitable Defenses to CERCLA Liability 
Some courts have held that defendants can assert equitable de-
fenses under CERCLA despite the "notwithstanding" and limited 
defense language. 4o These courts have used a variety of reasons to 
support this conclusion. For example, in United States v. Conser-
vation Chemical Corp., 41 the District Court for the Western District 
of Missouri found that section 106(a) of CERCLA explicitly incor-
porates traditional equitable defenses. 42 Because the standard of 
liability and associated defenses are the same under section 107 as 
under section 106, the court held that equitable defenses are avail-
able to defendants under section 107 as well. 43 
Similarly, in Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd.,44 the United 
States District Court in Arizona held that the defendant's equitable 
defenses could prevent a private plaintiff from recovering response 
costs under section 107(a).45 The plaintiffs argued that section 
107(b),s enumerated defenses46 were exclusive. The court held that 
Section 107(b) defenses were not exclusive, noting that the plaintiff's 
40 See, e.g., O'Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 726-27 (D.R.I. 1988) (court denied equitable 
defense of "unclean hands" because at most government merely was negligent); United States 
v. Moore, 703 F. Supp. 460, 462 (E.D. Va. 1988) (court refused to rnle that equitable defenses 
such as unclean hands, estoppel, and illegality cannot be raised in CERCLA actions); United 
States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626 (D.N.H. 1988) (elimination of equitable defenses 
under CERCLA is contrary to equitable principles and unwarranted by CERCLA's statutory 
language); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F. Supp. 448, 450-51 (D. Md. 1986) (court dismissed 
defense of exercise of due care under section 107(b) but not defenses of equitable estoppel, 
laches, and failure to join indispensable third parties); Violet v. Picillo, 613 F. Supp. 1563, 
1573 (D.R.I. 1986) (court refused to dismiss defendant's equitable defense of "unclean hands"); 
United States v. Conservation Chern. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,204 (D. Mo. 1985); Mardan Corp. 
v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057-59 (D. Ariz. 1984); see also Versatile Metals 
v. Union Corp., 693 F. Supp. 1563, 1572 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (court assumed that equitable defense 
of unclean hands is available but defendant failed to meet requirements). 
41 619 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mo. 1985). 
42 [d. at 204. Section 106(a) of CERCLA, which authorizes the federal government to take 
action necessary to abate immediate risks to public health, states that a court may "grant 
such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may require." CERCLA § 106(a), 
42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1982). 
43 619 F. Supp. at 205. The court also relied on Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 
305 (1982), in which the Supreme Court held that courts retained equitable power when 
determining whether injunctive relief must follow a statutory violation of the FWPCA. 
The Conservation Chemical court characterized the Romero-Barcelo holding as allowing 
traditional equitable defenses to injunctive relief under section 311 of the FWPCA. Like 
CERCLA section 107, section 311 also provides for liability subject to a limited number of 
defenses. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982). CERCLA's legislative history explicitly establishes section 
311 of the FWPCA as the basis fGr CERCLA's liability provisions. See supra note 18 and 
accompanying text. 
44 600 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Ariz. 1984), aff'd, 804 F.2d 1454 (9th Cir. 1985). 
45 [d. at 1058. 
46 See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation "would result in defendants being held liable even if 
they had already paid [plaintiff's] Section 107(a) claim in a prior 
lawsuit since res judicata, payment, and accord and satisfaction are 
not listed as defenses in subsection (b)."47 Other courts have held 
that because relief under section 107 is essentially restitution, an 
equitable remedy, equitable defenses should be assertable.48 
Not all courts agree that traditional equitable defenses are avail-
able in CERCLA liability actions. 49 For example, the District Court 
for the Western District of Michigan, in Kelley v. Thomas Solvent 
CO.,50 held that equitable defenses are unavailable to defendants 
when the plaintiff is a sovereign asserting public rights. 51 Some 
courts also have held that equitable defenses are limited by CER-
CLA's "notwithstanding" language. 52 In addition to a sovereign 
rights analysis, the Kelley court held that GERCLA's "notwith-
standing" language expressed "unequivocal" intent that liability was 
to be imposed subject only to the defenses set out in section 107(b).53 
Similarly, in United States v. Marisol, Inc.,M the District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that CERCLA's "notwith-
standing" language means that there are no statutory or procedural 
prerequisites to a cost-recovery action under section 107(a) as a 
matter of law. 55 
47 600 F. Supp. at 1056 n.9. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment 
on both the existence of a purchase agreement in which plaintiffs assumed liability, as well as 
the equitable doctrine of "unclean hands." The court limited the application of the "unclean 
hands" defense, however, to situations in which private plaintiffs, as opposed to a federal or 
state government, seek cost recovery. I d. at 1058. 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Mottolo, 695 F. Supp. 615, 626-27 (D.N.H. 1988); see also In 
re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893 (D. Mass. 1989). In Acushnet, 
the court indicated that equitable defenses barred against a sovereign's natural resources 
claims, because they are legal in nature. 722 F. Supp. at 899. The court left open the question 
of the viability of equitable defenses to the government's clean-up claims but expressed serious 
doubt about this viability. Id. at 899 n.15. 
49 See, e.g., United States v. Aceto Agric. Chern. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 
1989) (CERCLA provides only a limited number of statutorily prescribed defenses); United 
States v. Marisol, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 833, 841 (M.D. Pa. 1989); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 
714 F. Supp. 1439, 1445-46 n.3 <W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 
1053, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 1987); see also In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. 
Supp. 893, 899 n.15 (D. Mass. 1989). 
50 714 F. Supp. 1439 (W.D. Mich. 1989). 
51 Id. at 1445-46 n.3; see also United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1062 (C.D. 
Cal. 1987) (holding that equitable defenses to liability under CERCLA cannot be asserted 
against the government when it acts to protect public rights). 
62 Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1378-79; Marisol, 725 F. Supp. at 841; Kelley, 714 F. Supp. at 1445-
46 n.3. 
63 Kelley, 714 F. Supp. at 1445. 
54 725 F. Supp. 833 (M.D. Pa. 1989). 
55 Id. at 841. The court stated: "Any defenses offered by the instant defendants which 
argues [sic] that liability for response costs may be excused because of the government's 
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A close reading, however, indicates that even these courts have 
not determined that CERCLA's· "notwithstanding" language pre-
cludes all defenses other than those laid out in section 107(b). The 
Kelley holding, although broad on its face, should be read in the 
context of the defendant's proffered defense. The Kelley defendant 
had attempted to raise the statutory third-party defense,56 but the 
court found that the defendant had not met the statutory require-
ments. 57 Kelley thus stands for the proposition that the courts will 
not create new judicial variations of the statutory defense. Similarly, 
the M arisol court interpreted the "notwithstanding" language in 
light of the defendant's argument that the government had failed to 
comply with the notice requirements of CERCLA section 10458 and 
had failed to enter into a contract or cooperative agreement pursuant 
to section 104(c)(3).59 The Marisol court's broad pronouncement can 
thus be limited to statutory or procedural prerequisites found in 
other sections of CERCLA. Because the Kelley and Marisol courts 
were not presented with a defense based on a rule of civil procedure 
or a fundamental aspect of state corporate law, these decisions can-
not be read to preclude these defenses as well. 
Courts thus far have recognized that procedural and equitable 
defenses under CERCLA fall within traditional lines, consistent with 
the expectation of Congress. CERCLA's language and legislative 
history clearly indicate that Congress intended for corporate defen-
dants who caused hazardous waste problems in the past to pay for 
their cleanup. The legislative history also suggests, however, that 
section 107 was primarily intended to create a strict liability standard 
rather than an absolute liability standard. 60 Section 107, therefore, 
should not be read to eliminate all procedural or equitable defenses. 
One of those procedural requirements, established by Rule 17(b), 
is that a corporate defendant have the capacity to be sued. An 
failure to take certain statutory or procedural steps before bringing this action are insufficient 
as a matter of law." [d. 
56 Section 107(b)(3) provides that parties shall not be liable for damages caused solely by an 
act or omission of a third party if the defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence 
that he (a) exercised due care and (b) took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions 
of any such third party. [d. § 9607(b)(3). 
67 As one of many defenses, the defendant claimed that the releases were due "in whole or 
in part" to third parties, ignoring the statute's requirement that releases be caused solely by 
third parties. Kelley, 714 F. Supp. at 1446. Furthermore, the defendant failed to allege that 
it had exercised due care or had taken precautions against foreseeable acts and omissions of 
a third party. [d. 
68 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
69 [d. § 9604(c)(3). 
60 Developments, supra note 24, at 1550. 
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examination of the history of Rule 17(b), its effects in federal court, 
and courts' attempts to resolve other conflicts between federal rules 
and federal statutes may provide a useful analogy in evaluating the 
application of Rule 17(b) to CERCLA cases. 
III. RULE 17(b) OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. History 
Rule 17(b) governs the capacity of a party to sue or be sued. The 
rule states, in part, that "[t]he capacity [of a corporation] to sue or 
be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was orga-
nized."61 Courts have held that Rule 17(b) applies to both existing 
and dissolved corporations. 62 
The term "capacity" consistently has been interpreted to mean 
the ability of a party to have legal existence sufficient to use the 
federal courts, regardless of the particular cause of action or defense 
at issue. 63 The rule does not distinguish a corporation's capacity to 
sue or be sued in a diversity action from a federal question action, 
as it does with the capacity of an unincorporated association. 64 Thus, 
a corporation's capacity to use the federal courts usually is deter-
mined by state incorporation law, not by the type of action at issue. 65 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938.66 The 
rules were drafted by an advisory committee appointed by the Su-
preme Court, pursuant to authority granted to the Court by Con-
gress under the Rules Enabling Act of 1934.67 In the Act, Congress 
authorized the Supreme Court to develop a uniform set of procedures 
to govern actions in federal district courts. Congress intended the 
61 28 U.S.C. app. 17(b) (1982). 
62 6 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 21.40 (3d ed. 1981); see also C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1563, at 738 (1971). 
63 "Generally, capacity is conceived of as a procedural issue dealing with the personal 
qualifications of a party to litigate and typically is determined without regard to the particular 
claim or defense being asserted." C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 62, § 1559, at 727-
28; see also Johnson v. Helicopter & Airplane Servo Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726, 729 (D. Md. 
1975); De Franco V. United States, 18 F.R.D. 156, 159 (S.D. Cal. 1955); United States V. 
Association of Am. R.R.s, 4 F.R.D. 510, 517 (D. Neb. 1945). 
64 Rule 17(b) states that "a partnership or other unincorporated association, which has no 
such capacity by the law of such state, may sue or be sued in its common name for the purpose 
of enforcing for or against it a substantive right existing under the Constitution or laws of 
the United States." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b), 28 U.S.C. app. 17(b) (1982). 
65 See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. 
66 D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TAIT, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 28 (1982). 
67 Rules Enabling Act (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982». 
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rules to eliminate the difficulties presented to litigants, lawyers, and 
judges by the complicated variations of common-law pleadings that 
existed in federal district courts. 68 
The Advisory Committee's Notes regarding corporate capacity are 
meager, indicating only that the Committee relied on a law review 
article authored by the Committee's Reporter, and a single Supreme 
Court case. 69 The Rule's legislative history indicates that the Com-
mittee drafted Rule 17(b) to codify existing law on the subject of a 
corporation's capacity to bring suit in federal courts. 70 
Members of the House Judiciary Committee, which held hearings 
on the rules in 1938, expressed some concern over the extent of 
power granted to states ofincorporatlon under this rule.71 Of primary 
concern to the members was a state's apparent ability, under the 
rule, to create a corporation that could be insulated from suit by 
statutory limitations on its capacity while continuing to conduct 
business in other states. 72 
Dean William Clark, Reporter for the Advisory Committee, tes-
tified before the House Judiciary Committee that he believed that 
the rule ensured that a foreign corporation could sue in federal courts 
in states in which it was doing business. 73 In other words, the forum 
state could not insulate its citizens from suit by restricting a foreign 
corporation's ability to sue in its courts and the federal courts within 
its borders. 
When asked whether the incorporating state could limit its cor-
porations' capacity to be sued in either its own courts or a forum 
state's courts, Clark indicated that he thought such a law would be 
invalid on constitutional grounds. 74 Clark also indicated that the rule 
as drafted would allow a corporation to be sued in any state in which 
68 D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD & C. TAIT, supra note 66, at 28-29. 
69 The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that committee members relied generally upon 
Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-II. Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE L.J. 
1291 (1935) and a previous Supreme Court decision, David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Automobile 
Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), regarding the capacity of a corporation. Surprisingly, 
the Advisory Committee made no mention of two other Supreme Court cases in which the 
Court finnly established that corporate capacity to be sued was within the exclusive province 
of state law. See infra notes 76-80 and accompanying text. 
70 Hearings on the Rules of Civil Procedure for District Courts Before the House Comm. 
on Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1938) (statement of Dean Charles Clark, Reporter, 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure). 
71 ld. at 9-10. 
72 ld. at 9-13, 40-43. 
73ld. at 10. 
741d. at 11. 
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it did business as long as the corporation retained capacity to sue 
and be sued under its state law. 75 
The legislative history of Rule 17(b) does not include any consid-
eration of the potential clash between a federal statute and a cor-
poration's capacity to be sued. The drafters simply attempted to 
resolve whether forum states could insulate their citizens from suit, 
or whether incorporating states could insulate their corporations 
while the corporation continued to do business elsewhere. The leg-
islative history, therefore, is of little value in determining whether 
CERCLA justifies an override of Rule 17(b). An examination of how 
corporate dissolution, both before and after the adoption of Rule 
17(b), has been treated by federal courts may provide more help in 
resolving the clash. 
B. Dissolved Corporations in the Federal Courts 
In 1927, before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the Supreme Court established in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. 
v. Oklahoma76 that only state statutory authority could extend the 
capacity of a dissolved corporation to sue or be sued. 77 The Court 
developed this doctrine more fully in Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. 
Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Building COrp.78 In Chicago Title, the 
Court held that the plaintiff, a dissolved corporation under Illinois 
law, could not initiate a proceeding in federal bankruptcy court. 
Justice Sutherland, writing for the majority, held that the existence, 
and hence the capacity, of a state-created corporation was a matter 
"exclusively of state power . . . to be decided by the state Legisla-
ture."79 The majority added that the "federal government is pow-
erless to resurrect a corporation which the state has put out of its 
existence for all purposes,"80 and that the federal government could 
not add to or take away from the terms of a state-created corpora-
tion's existence. 81 
75 [d. at 12. 
76 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927). 
77 The Court held that "[t]he matter really is not procedural or controlled by the rules of 
the court in which the litigation pends. It concerns the fundamental law of the corporation 
enacted by the State which brought the corporation into being." [d. at 259-60. 
78 302 U.S. 120 (1937). 
79 [d. at 127-28; cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state 
law."). 
80 [d. at 128. 
81 [d. Justices Stone, Black, and Cardozo dissented. Writing for the dissent, Justice Cardozo 
viewed capacity as more than the ability to meet the legal requirements of state incorporations 
law. [d. at 130 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). Rather, he reasoned that because the dissolved 
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The Oklahoma Natural Gas and Chicago Title view of capacity 
as the exclusive province of state law generally has prevailed. Fed-
eral courts have looked to state dissolution law, sometimes with-
out explicit reference to Rule 17(b), to determine whether a cor-
poration retains legal capacity to sue or be sued. 82 When state law 
has clearly continued the existence of a corporation, suits 
based on both diversity83 and federal causes of action have 
corporation had the capacity to defend claims pending against it in state court under state 
law, it also retained capacity to initiate federal bankruptcy proceedings. [d. Justice Cardozo 
saw the question as one of federal preemption, arguing that a state could not continue the life 
of a corporation for its own purposes while destroying its life to withdraw the supremacy of 
federal law. [d. at 131. (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
Chicago Title may also be limited to its facts. The shareholders of a corporation that had 
been dissolved for failure to comply with state law sought to use the federal courts to revive 
the corporation in order to file for reorganization. [d. at 121-23. The majority expressly set 
aside the question of whether creditors could bring suit against a dissolved corporation in 
bankruptcy court. [d. at 124. The Court stated: "The question presented here differs sub-
stantially from the question presented [by creditors seeking to sue a dissolved corporation] 
.... The sole question now for determination is whether ... a [dissolved] corporation ... 
may, nevertheless, itself invoke the powers of a court of bankruptcy .... " [d. On these facts, 
the Court saw no conflict between state law and the federal bankruptcy laws. [d. at 126. 
Rather, the Court saw that allowing a corporation dissolved by the state for unlawful activity 
to revive itself with the aid of a federal statute would impermissibly thwart the operation of 
state law. [d. at 129. The holding in Chicago Title, therefore, may be applied in cases where 
an involuntarily dissolved corporation seeks to sue in federal court. 
Oklahoma Natuml Gas may also be limited to its facts. In that case, the Court was faced 
with a conflict based on a common-law claim, not a governmental plaintiff suing a dissolved 
corporation for violation of a federal statute. 273 U.S. 257 (1927). The Court, therefore, did 
not consider whether a competing federal interest could ever abrogate the rule established in 
the case. Nevertheless, federal courts have consistently relied on the broad holdings of these 
two cases to allow dissolved corporations to escape liability under state law. See inJm note 
82 and accompanying text. 
82 See, e.g., United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, 791 F.2d 666 (9th Cir. 1985); Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Superior Dodge Inc., 538 F.2d 616, 617-18 (4th Cir.), cen. denied, 429 U.S. 
1042 (1976); Johnson v. Helicopter and Airplane Servo Corp., 404 F. Supp. 726, 729-30 (D. 
Md. 1975); Textile Banking CO. V. Colonial Chern. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 824, 826 (N.D. Ga. 
1967); Sevits V. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810,811 (D.N.Y. 1966). 
83 In limited circumstances, some federal courts have held that Rule 17(b), directing the 
courts to look to the law of the state of incorporation, does not apply in diversity actions. 
These courts instead have allowed laws of the forum state, known as door-closing statutes, 
rather than the state of incorporation to determine a corporation's capacity to be sued. This 
approach was first established in Woods V. Interstate Realty Corp., 337 U.S. 535 (1949). 
In Woods, the Supreme Court determined that under the Erie doctrine, 304 U.S. 64, 78 
(1938) (holding held that in diversity actions, the federal court must look to the forum state's 
substantive law for the applicable law), a corporation that has not met the forum state's 
requirements for doing business within the state is barred from using the state, and hence 
the federal, courts of the forum state. Woods, 337 U.S. at 538 (1949) (Court reversed judgment 
for corporate plaintiff who had won in federal court although he would have been barred from 
bringing suit in state court for failing to comply with forum state requirements for doing 
business). 
The Woods Court deemed the rule announced in David Lupton's Sons CO. V. Automobile 
Club of America, 225 U.S. 489 (1912), which held that the federal courts were open to a 
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survived. 84 In some cases, federal courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have had to construe state law broadly to allow suits against 
dissolved corporations for criminal violations. 85 In none of these 
corporation despite the fact that the state courts were closed, and on which Rule 17(b) in part 
is based, FED. R. Crv. P. 17(b) Advisory Committee Notes, to be "obsolete" in light of Erie. 
Woods, 337 U.S. at 537 (quoting Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), in which the Court 
upheld dismissal of suit in federal court to obtain deficiency judgment where such judgment 
was unavailable under forum state law). 
Lower courts are divided over the continuing vitality of the Woods holding. A few courts 
have continued to apply the Woods holding and have abrogated Rule 17(b). See, e.g., Weinstock 
v. Sinatra, 379 F. Supp. 274, 276-77 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Power City Communications, Inc. v. 
Calaveras Tel. Co., 280 F. Supp. 808, 812 (E.D. Cal. 1968); Textile Banking Co. v. Colonial 
Chern. Corp., 285 F. Supp. 824, 826 (D. Ga. 1967). 
The Weinstock court, however, acknowledged that the Woods holding was unfair to plaintiffs 
when it allowed a corporation to escape liability because it lacked the capacity to be sued 
based on its failure to comply with a forum state's laws. 379 F. Supp. at 276-77. In this case, 
the defendant, a hotel corporation incorporated in Delaware, was being sued in tort. The 
defendant had failed to pay state taxes and was barred by California law from using the state 
(and federal courts under Erie) courts. [d. Therefore, the court held that the defendant 
retained the capacity to be sued under Delaware law based on Rule 17(b), but it had forfeited 
the capacity to defend itself based on California law. The court allowed a default judgment to 
stand unless the defendant revived itself by complying with the forum state's corporate tax 
requirements. [d. at 277. 
Other courts have rejected the Woods holding in light of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 
(1965), which determined that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are presumptively valid. 
See Farris v. Sambo's Restaurants, Inc., 498 F. Supp. 143, 145 (N.D. Tex. 1980); Emusol 
Corp. v. Rubenstein & Son Produce, Inc., 111 F. Supp. 410 (N.D. Tex. 1953) (expressly 
rejecting Woods holding). 
For a detailed discussion of the Woods holding and its effect on Rule 17(b) in diversity 
actions, see Little, Out of Woods and into the Rules: The Relationship Between State Foreign 
Corporation Door-Closing Statutes and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b), 72 VA. L. 
REV. 767 (1986). Little concludes that Rule 17(b) is both constitutional and within the scope 
of the Rules Enabling Act, and therefore, under Hanna, courts should reject the Supreme 
Court's holding in Woods. [d. at 769. 
84 See, e.g., United States v. Mobile Materials, Inc., 776 F.2d 1476,1479-80 (10th Cir. 1985); 
Moore v. Occupational Safety and Health Rev. Comm'n (OSHRC), 591 F.2d 991, 995 (4th Cir. 
1979) (OSHRC must follow Virginia law to determine liability of corporate officers); United 
States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 908 (9th Cir. 1974) (Duniway, J., concurring), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 1120 (1975); United States v. Indian Hill Farms, Inc., 255 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1958); 
United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 374, 376 (D.D.C. 
1956); Newmark v. Abeel, 102 F. Supp. 993, 993 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1952); Signal Gasoline Corp. 
v. United States, 46 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1942). 
Even when state law provided only a "murky answer" to the question of capacity, a court 
construed state law to allow the plaintiff's claims against dissolved corporations. Klebanow 
v. New York Produce Exch., 344 F.2d 294,299 (2d Cir. 1965). 
85 See, e.g., Melrose Distillers, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 271 (1959). The Supreme 
Court held that it was not bound by state court interpretation of state law and read the term 
''proceeding'' to include criminal prosecutions. See also United States v. P.F. Collier & Son 
Corp., 208 F.2d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 1953) (expansive reading of "proceeding" under Delaware 
dissolution law); United States v. Arcos Corp., 234 F. Supp. 355, 358 (N.D. Ohio 1964) 
(expansive reading of terms "remedy" and "liability" under Pennsylvania survival statute); 
United States v. San Diego Grocers Ass'n, 177 F. Supp. 352 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (expansive 
reading of term "existence" under California survival statute). 
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cases, however, have the courts interpreted the federal substantive 
statute to override Rule 17(b) or to preempt state law. 
Conversely, where corporate dissolution has been completed to 
the satisfaction of state law, suits against dissolved corporations in 
federal courts based both on diversity86 and federal question 
jurisdiction87 have been barred. For example, suits by the federal 
government for criminal violations, primarily based on antitrust stat-
utes, have occasionally been barred by the defendant's dissolution. 88 
In these cases, the courts have not relied on Rule 17(b) to determine 
corporate capacity. Rather, they look to state law because the Sher-
man Act defines persons to include corporations existing under the 
laws of any state.89 Nevertheless, these courts, like courts following 
Rule 17(b), have allowed state dissolution law to prevent federal 
claims. 90 Both the Sherman Act and Rule 17(b) cases reflect federal 
courts' general understanding that the determination of corporate 
capacity to be sued is within the exclusive province of state law. 
IV. CONFLICTS BETWEEN FEDERAL STATUTES AND THE RULES 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
A. The Gustin-Bacon Test 
Federal courts have developed a test to apply when faced with a 
conflict between a federal rule of civil procedure and a federal stat-
ute. First announced by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1970 
86 Many of these diversity-based cases involved product liability claims brought by citizens 
who purchased products before dissolution but did not bring a claim until after the defendant 
corporation had dissolved. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 463 F. Supp. 
117, 119-20 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (trust fund theory not available to plaintiff whose products 
liability claim had not accrued at time of dissolution); Stone v. Gibson Refrig. Sales Corp., 
366 F. Supp. 733, 734 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (court barred products liability cause of action that 
arose four months after corporation dissolved). 
87 See Community Elec. Serv., Inc. v. National Elec. Contractors, 869 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 
1989) (dissolved corporation lacked capacity to sue for federal antitrust violations); Canadian 
Ace Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 448 F. Supp. 769, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (dissolved 
corporation not entitled to bring action under Clayton Act after Illinois survival period had 
expired), afl'd without opinion, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 884 (1979); 
Walder v. Paramount Publix Corp., 132 F. Supp. 912, 917 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (dissolved corpo-
ration unable to sue for antitrust violations); United States v. Leche, 44 F. Supp. 765, 767 
(E.D. La. 1942) (dissolution prevented federal criminal prosecution). 
88 See United States v. Line Material Co., 202 F.2d 929,932 (6th Cir. 1953); United States 
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 140 F.2d 834, 840 (10th Cir. 1944). 
89 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1982). 
90 See supra note 88. The Sherman Act's express adoption of state corporate law avoids the 
preemption question. See infra notes 111-14 and accompanying text. 
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in United States v. Gustin-Bacon Division, Certain-teed Products 
Corp. ,91 the test requires that, unless congressional intent to 
supersede a rule "clearly appears, subsequently enacted statutes 
ought to be construed to harmonize with the Rules."92 
Unfortunately, this test is not easily applied. In Gustin-Bacon, 
the court determined that the requirement of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, that complaints allege facts pertaining to the pattern or 
practice of discrimination, did not supersede Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a). Rule 8(a) requires that complaints contain "a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 
to relief. "93 The court's brief analysis first focused on the history and 
purpose of Rule 8(a).94 The court then determined that, despite the 
language of the Civil Rights Act, which on its face requires more 
than is required under the rule, the legislative history of the Act 
expressed no intent, clear or otherwise, to supersede Rule 8(a).95 
Thus, under the Gustin-Bacon test, a statutory requirement that 
conflicts on its face with a rule alone is not enough to supersede a 
federal rule. 96 Because the Gustin-Bacon court failed to find the 
requisite clear intent in the legislative history, what qualifies as clear 
intent was left unanswered. This lack of example compounds the 
problem of subjectivity posed by a test that relies on "express intent, 
clear or otherwise."97 
Two cases relying on Gustin-Bacon to resolve a conflict between 
a federal statute and a federal rule provide only limited guidance in 
resolving a conflict between CERCLA and Rule 17(b). In Unter-
meyer v. Fidelity Daily Income Trust,98 the United States District 
Court in Massachusetts also emphasized the need for clear intent to 
supersede in the statute's legislative history. The Untermeyer court 
failed to find the clear intent required by the test. First, the court 
noted that the statute itself was silent on the rule. The court then 
stated that "[t]o assume that Congress has spoken sub silentio would 
require strong indicia of legislative intent."99 
91 426 F.2d 539 (10th Cir.), em. denied, 400 U.S. 832 (1970). 
92 [d. at 542. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit cited 7 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 
~ 86.04 [4], at 4966. The court cited no other authority for this proposition. 
93 28 U.S.C. app. 8(a) (1982). 
94 Gustin-Bacon, 426 F.2d at 542. 
96 [d. at 542-43. 
96 [d. 
97 [d. at 543. 
IlS 79 F.R.D. 36 (D. Mass.), vacated on other grounds, 580 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1978). 
99 [d. Because the court found the legislative history inconclusive, it held that the statute 
did not supersede the rule. See id. 
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Of further assistance is the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' 
decision in Robbins v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co,u)() The 
court found that a federal statute implicitly superseded Rule 62(d).lOl 
The conflicting statute, the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend-
ments to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, did not 
explicitly state that it superseded Rule 62(d).102 Nonetheless, the 
court found that the Act's entire scheme of liability, which provides 
for immediate payment of benefits upon judgment, was wholly in-
consistent with Rule 62(d), which allows for an immediate stay if the 
defendant posts a bond,103 and therefore the statute superseded the 
rule. 
Gustin-Bacon and these subsequent cases establish that a federal 
statute may supersede a federal rule of civil procedure only when 
the statute, by its entire scheme or by its legislative history, ex-
presses clear congressional intent. Under limited circumstances in-
volving the capacity of an individual to be sued, however, courts 
have used a more general balancing approach to resolve conflicts 
between a statute and Rule 17(b).104 These cases involve prisoners' 
right to sue for infringement of their civil rights protected by section 
1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code. l05 
While Rule 17(b) directs the court to look at state law when 
determining an individual's capacity to sue, as well as a corporation's, 
some state statutes eliminate a prisoner's capacity to sue. 106 Section 
1983, however, creates a cause of action for "any citizen of the United 
States,"107 a grant of capacity that does not expressly supersede 
Rule 17(b). Nevertheless, in Almond v. Kent,108 the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals relied on the underlying policies of both the statute 
and the rule to find an override of Rule 17(b). The court reasoned 
that the preservation of constitutional rights, when balanced against 
the state's interest in preventing a prisoner from suing, supported 
an override of 17(b). This balancing approach to resolving conflicts 
100 800 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1986). 
101 28 U.S.C. app. 62(d) (1982). 
102 Robbins, 800 F.2d at 643. 
103 Id. 
104 Almond v. Kent, 459 F.2d 200, 203 (4th Cir. 1972); Weller v. Dickson, 314 F.2d 598, 601 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 845 (1963); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112, 116 
(N.D. Cal. 1955). But see Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222, 226 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). 
106 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
106 See, e.g., Almond, 459 F.2d at 203; McCollum, 130 F. Supp. at 116. 
1M 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). 
108 459 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1972). 
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between federal statutes and Rule 17(b) is also of some assistance 
in CERCLA conflicts.109 
Rule 17(b) differs from other federal rules, however, because 
rather than prescribing a federal rule of law regarding capacity, it 
directs a federal court to defer to state law. Significant problems, 
therefore, stemming from the courts' long history of recognizing 
exclusive state control over state-created corporations, still exist 
with imposing liability under federal statutes on a corporation that 
claims that it has met its state's dissolution requirements. A discus-
sion of the conflict between CERCLA and Rule 17(b) also requires 
consideration of federal preemption doctrine to determine whether 
CERCLA preempts state dissolution law. llo 
v. CERCLA AND THE PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW 
A. Federal Preemption of State Law 
The Supreme Court has outlined three ways in which federal law 
may be found to preempt state law. 111 Congress may: (1) explicitly 
define the extent to which it preempts state law; (2) despite the 
absence of express preemptive language, Congress may indicate an 
intent to occupy an entire field of regulation; or (3) despite the 
absence of congressional intent to occupy a field, Congress may 
preempt state law to the extent that the state law actually conflicts 
109 See infra notes 228--31 and accompanying text. 
110 Another commentator has tackled the problem of the liability of a dissolved corporation 
under CERCLA from a preemption perspective. See Note, Corporate Life After Death: 
CERCLA Preemption of State Corporate Dissolution Law, 88 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1989). The 
author concludes that CERCLA's plain meaning and legislative intent do not provide a 
conclusive answer on whether Congress intended to preempt state corporate law. [d. at 148. 
By way of analogy to CERCLA's preemption of state substantive hazardous waste law, state 
government tort immunity statutes, and federal common law for hazardous waste releases, 
the author argues that CERCLA preempts state corporate law on the question of dissolution 
as well. [d. at 149. 
The author ignores, however, the question of whether CERCLA also overrides the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, in particular Rule 17(b), and the availability of equitable defenses 
under CERCLA. The author also makes no mention of other federal statutes that courts have 
held inapplicable due to corporate dissolution. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
Under traditional preemption analysis, application of Rule 17(b) and state corporate law would 
always frustrate the purpose of Congress whenever a corporate defendant escapes liability 
due to dissolution. See Levin Metals Corp. v. Parr-Richmond Terminal Co., 817 F.2d 1448, 
1451 (9th Cir. 1987), discussed infra notes 181-97 and accompanying text. 
111 Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. and Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 
461, 467 (1984). 
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with federal law. 112 Regarding the third test, the Court has deter-
mined that such a conflict arises when compliance with both state 
and federal law is impossible113 or when the state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress. 114 
The Court has also established, however, that preemption is not 
a preferred conclusion. The Court has stated both that "[t]he exer-
cise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed"115 and that 
powers of the states were not to be superseded unless that was the 
"clear and manifest purpose of Congress. "116 The Court has also 
stated that preemption may be found when the federal interest is 
"so dominant" that the federal system precludes enforcement of state 
laws on the same subject.1l7 
Not surprisingly, federal courts have found that federal pollution 
control laws that establish standards for releases preempt less strin-
gent state standards. 118 The Supreme Court also has addressed 
whether CERCLA preempts state law in the area of tax collection 
for hazardous waste spills. In Exxon Corp. v. Hunt,119 the Supreme 
Court ruled that CERCLA section 114(c),120 which authorized the 
collection of an excise tax on the petrochemical industry to support 
CERCLA's trust fund, preempted part of a New Jersey law which 
also required the petrochemical industry to pay a hazardous waste 
clean-up fund tax. 121 Because the statutes conflicted on their face, 
the Court applied the first test122 and held that section 114(c) pre-
vented collection of hazardous waste taxes at the state level. 123 The 
Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether CERCLA preempts 
112Id. 
113Id. (citing Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963». 
114Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941». 
115 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 203 (1952). 
116 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
117 Id. 
118 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 
1 (1983); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); Chevron, USA v. Hammond, 726 
F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1984). For a comprehensive discussion of federal pollution control statutes 
and preemption, see Glicksman, Federal Pre-Emption and Private Legal Remedies for Pol-
lution, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 121 (1985-86) (arguing that federal pollution statutes should not 
preempt state law remedies). 
119 475 U.S. 355 (1986). For another discussion of CERCLA preemption in Exxon, see Note, 
supra note 110, at 135-37. 
120 42 U.S.C. § 9614(c) (1982) (deleted by SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 114(a) (1986». 
121 New Jersey Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1O-23.11-11z 
(West 1982 & Supp. 1985). 
122 Exxon, 475 U.S. at 362. 
123 Id. at 376-77. 
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other state or federal laws that stand as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment of its goals. 
Because state dissolution law, in both federal and state courts, is 
the body of law determining a dissolved corporation's capacity to be 
sued, an examination of state dissolution laws highlights ways in 
which state law can operate to frustrate the accomplishment of 
CERCLA's objectives. 
B. State Dissolution Laws 
A corporation's ability to end its existence through dissolution has 
a long legal tradition. At common law before the American Revo-
lution, death generally ended any causes of action against an indi-
vidual,124 The Supreme Court, in Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. 
Oklahoma, 125 drew a parallel between the dissolution of a corporation 
and the death of an individual, and held that only statutory authority 
could prolong the life of a corporation past its dissolution. 126 Because 
causes of action abated upon dissolution at common law, states re-
acted by passing statutes extending the life of a corporation beyond 
dissolution. 127 These statutes, commonly called survival statutes, 
typically provide a corporation with a period of time to wind up its 
affairs. During this period, a corporation can sue and be sued. 128 All 
states now acknowledge, to some degree, the interests of creditors 
and other claimants not recognized at common law. 
Beyond this fundamental similarity, state corporate law governing 
dissolution varies widely. The length of time for the survival of 
remedies varies from two to five years, and some states extend this 
period indefinitely.129 Some states apply these statutes to corpora-
tions that have dissolved voluntarily, but allow indefinite post-dis-
124 Marcus, Suability of Dissolved Corporations-A Study in Interstate and Federal-State 
Relationships, 58 HARV. L. REV. 675, 676 (1945). Generally, contract actions survived, but, 
with a few exceptions, tort actions did not. Id. at 677. See also 16 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 8113, at 358 (1988). U[I]n the absence of statutory 
provisions to the contrary, the effect of dissolution is to put an end to the corporation's 
existence for all purposes whatsoever." Id. 
125 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927). 
126Id. at 259. 
127 W. FLETCHER, supra note 124, § 8143 at 443 (1988). For a survey of state dissolution 
procedures, see REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 14.05 statutory comparison at 1482-
84 (Supp. 1986) [hereinafter MODEL ACT]. 
128 W. FLETCHER, supra note 124, § 8143. 
129 MODEL ACT, supra note 127, § 14.07 statutory comparison at 1505. Fifteen states, 
including California, Michigan, and New Jersey, place no express time limit on the survival 
of remedies. Id. 
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solution suits for corporations that have been dissolved for delin-
quency.130 Other differences include court supervision of the 
dissolution process,131 transferee liability,132 and involuntary disso-
lution for failure to pay taxes or to file annual reports with the 
state. 133 In some states, corporations may appoint liquidating trust-
ees to wind up their affairs. 134 
At common law, despite the abatement of claims against a dis-
solved corporation, an equitable trust fund theory sometimes was 
applied to allow creditors to recover from the undistributed assets 
or from the shareholders. 135 Many courts have held, however, that 
survival statutes replace the trust fund theory, precluding recovery 
from shareholders at the end of the winding-up period as well as 
from the undistributed assets of the corporation. 136 
1. Pre- vs. Post-Dissolution Claims 
State laws also differ in their treatment of pre- and post-dissolu-
tion claims. Most survival statutes state explicitly that pre-dissolu-
tion claims must be brought within the statutory period. 137 Some 
130 Marcus, supra note 124, at 683-90; W. FLETCHER, supra note 124, § 8168, at 543-44. 
131 For instance, Massachusetts and New Hampshire allow for the distribution of assets 
under voluntary dissolution to be undertaken with court supervision. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 156B, 
§ 103 (1970); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:88 (1987). 
132 See Products Liability-Liability of Transferees for Defective Products Manufactured 
by Transferor, 30 VAND. L. REV. 238, 248 (1977) (discussing two cases in which dissolved 
corporation's assets were purchased by transferees). 
133 W. FLETCHER, supra note 124, § 7997, at 66-67; see also, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW 
§ 1103 (McKinney 1986) (Attorney General may bring action for dissolution for violation of 
law resulting in forfeiture of charter). 
134 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 279 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
135 For a comprehensive examination of the trust fund doctrine, and the effect of survival 
statutes on it, see Friedlander & Lannie, Post-Dissolution Liabilities of Shareholders and 
Directors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1363 (1978); Henn 
& Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Products Liability Claims, 56 CORNELL L. 
REV. 865, 880-82 (1971); Schoone, Shareholder Liability Upon Voluntary Dissolution of 
Corporation, 44 MARQ. L. REV. 415 (1961). See also W. FLETCHER, supra note 124, § 8161, 
at 518. 
136 See, e.g., Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Teter, 117 F.2d 716, 726-27 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 620 (1941); Hunter v. Fort Worth Capital Corp., 620 S.W.2d 547, 550--51 
(Tex. 1981); Blankenship v. Demmler Mfg. Co., 89 Ill. App. 3d 569, 572-74, 411 N.E.2d 1153, 
1155--57 (1980); see also Gonzales v. Progressive Tool & Die Co., 455 F. Supp. 363, 367-69 
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). But see Green v. Oilwell, Div. of U.S. Steel Corp., 767 P.2d 1348,1353--54 
(Okla. 1989) (Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed equitable trust fund theory to allow plaintiff 
to recover from shareholders for post-dissolution claim). 
137 A majority of states follow the approach of section 105 of the 1969 Model Business 
Corporation Act, which limited claims to those arising pre-dissolution. See, e.g., ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13A, § 1122 (1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2111 (Purdon 1967). 
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courts have interpreted this language to mean that only pre-disso-
lution claims can be brought after dissolution, thus barring post-
dissolution claims altogether.138 Because CERCLA applies retroac-
tively,139 its cause of action applies to corporate activities that may 
have occurred prior to both passage of the statute and dissolution. 
In states where this interpretation has been adopted by the courts, 
corporations that dissolved prior to CERCLA's passage may be able 
to claim successfully that a CERCLA claim, although based on pre-
dissolution activities, arose post-dissolution and is therefore 
barred. 140 
2. Dissolution Under the 1985 Model Business Corporation Act 
An examination of the treatment of claims against dissolved cor-
porations under the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (Model 
Act)141 illustrates how some drafters have sought to balance the 
competing interests of claimants and dissolved corporations. 142 Un-
der the Model Act, dissolution takes place in a two-step process. It 
begins upon the filing of a notice of intent to dissolve with the state 
of incorporation. 143 Thereafter, the corporation must stop conducting 
business as usual, but may defend and bring suits, as well as sell 
and distribute the assets of the corporation. 144 The corporation is 
required to notify known claimants of its dissolution. 145 All claims 
against the corporation, whether known or unknown, must be 
brought within five years of the commencement of the winding-up 
period. 146 The Model Act provides that claims may be enforced 
138 Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 135, at 1375. At least one court, however, has inter-
preted the statute to mean that only pre-dissolution claims must be brought within the time 
period, thereby allowing post-dissolution claims indefinitely by shareholders. See id. at 1371-
75 (discussing Levy v. Liebling, 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 936 (1957». 
Under this interpretation, CERCLA claims could be brought at any time after dissolution. 
139 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
140 This argument was made successfully by the defendant in Levin Metals v. Parr Richmond 
Terminal Corp., 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987), discussed infra notes 181-97 and accompanying 
text. 
141 MODEL ACT, supra note 127, §§ 14.03, 14.05-14.07. 
142 For another discussion of the policies underlying the 1985 Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act's dissolution provisions in light of CERCLA, see Note, supra note 110, at 
155-56. The author concludes that the Model Act's five-year limitation on claims is insufficient 
for CERCLA claims. [d. 
143 MODEL ACT, supra note 127, § 14.03, at 1467-68. 
144 [d. § 14.05, at 1478-79. 
145 [d. § 14.06, at 1491. 
146 [d. § 14.07, at 1499. 
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against the dissolved corporation's undistributed assets147 or against 
the shareholders' distributions. 148 
The Official Comment to the Model Act sheds light on the policy 
underlying these provisions. The Comment acknowledges that ear-
lier versions of the Model Act, which contained a two-year winding-
up period, did not recognize the serious problem created by barring 
claims brought after the end of the winding-up period. 149 On the one 
hand, preventing an otherwise valid claim based on a mechanical 
two-year limitation period results in obvious injustice to the barred 
plaintiff.150 On the other hand, permitting these suits indefinitely 
makes it impossible for the corporation to end completely. Such an 
indefinite ending leaves other creditors and shareholders either with-
out their share of the assets or without certainty about the assets 
they will receive. The drafters of the Model Act thus chose a five-
year winding-up period believing that most claims would be brought 
within that time period. 151 They thereby struck what they deter-
mined to be a reasonable balance between competing interests. 152 
The measure of what is a reasonable balance will vary from leg-
islature to legislature, but states that provide only a two-year wind-
ing-up period153 unreasonably prevent some claims from being 
brought against dissolved corporations. Products liability cases pose 
particularly difficult policy questions because injury from a defective 
product may not become evident until years after the survival period 
has expired. 154 Governmental entities, with bureaucratic impedi-
ments to bringing suits swiftly, also may find it difficult to bring suit 
147 [d. 
148 [d. These claims may be made against shareholders' distributions according to their 
prorata share of the claim or the amount they receive in distribution, whichever is smaller. 
[d. at 1500. The purpose of this scheme is to encourage plaintiffs to sue as many shareholders 
as possible, rather than suing only those shareholders who received large shares in the 
distribution. [d. at 1503. 
149 [d. § 14.07, at 1500 official comment. 
150 [d. at 1501. 
151 [d. 
152 [d. Some commentators have identified the state's interest as "certainty and definite-
ness." See, e.g., Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 135, at 1401. Others have cited practical 
difficulties in tracing former employees, records, and other pertinent information. See Henn 
& Alexander, supra note 135, at 913. 
153 Twenty-five jurisdictions provide a two-year survival period. MODEL ACT, supra note 
127, § 14.07, at 1505 statutory comparison. 
154 This problem has received a great deal of attention from commentators in recent years. 
See generally Note, Recognizing Product Liability Claims at Dissolution: The Compatibility 
of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1048 (1987); see also Henn & 
Alexander, supra note 135. 
1990] CERCLA LIABILITY 879 
within a short period of time. 155 CERCLA actions, brought for cor-
porate behavior that may have occurred many years prior to suit, 
pose additional administrative burdens. Location of records and per-
sonnel, in addition to an initial problem of discovering hazardous 
waste, may make a two-year period for the government to bring a 
CERCLA action unreasonable. 156 
An approach one commentator has suggested is to compare the 
length of the statute of limitations for a particular cause of action 
against the length of the winding-up period. 157 If a statute provides 
a long statute of limitations, a shorter winding-up period cuts off the 
plaintiff's ability to bring an action before the legislature intended 
under the substantive statute. While there is some theoretical sup-
port for linking a corporation's capacity to be sued with the particular 
substantive law at issue, neither the legislatures nor the courts have 
adopted this approach. 
Although all states have recognized the need to protect claimants 
from the harshness of complete abatement at dissolution, they differ 
widely on where the balance should be struck between the counter-
vailing interests of claimants and dissolved corporations. The Model 
Act's approach, with a five-year winding-up period, provides more 
favorable conditions for governmental plaintiffs under CERCLA ac-
tions than the two-year period that most states have adopted. Be-
cause of variations in state winding-up periods, dissolved corpora-
tions in some states may remain liable under CERCLA while those 
in states with shorter winding-up periods or with a bar on post-
dissolution claims may escape liability, based on factors unrelated to 
their CUlpability under the statute. These variations in liability 
clearly undercut the intent of CERCLA: to impose a nationwide, 
uniform scheme of liability in order to discourage corporations from 
locating in those states with more lenient liability laws. 158 
An uncritical application of Rule 17(b) and state dissolution law 
will lead, therefore, to conflicts between CERCLA's primary goals 
and many state dissolution laws. In general, three possibilities for 
the courts exist: (1) to follow Rule 17(b) and look to state law to find 
capacity; (2) to follow Rule 17(b) and look to state law, but fail to 
155 Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 135, at 1407. 
156 CERCLA has been amended to include a six-year statute of limitations for the initiation 
of suits, but the six-year period begins from the date of the initiation of on-site remedial 
construction, not from the date of release of the waste into the environment. 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 9613(g)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1986). 
157 [d. at 1410. 
158 See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. 
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find capacity; or (3) to reject Rule 17(b) altogether and impose lia-
bility regardless of dissolution by finding preemption. Courts in six 
CERCLA cases have faced this problem, and have resolved the 
conflict resulting in three of the potential outcomes. An examination 
of these cases reveals both the ways that courts have applied state 
dissolution law in CERCLA actions and the courts' alternatives 
when finding no capacity to be sued under state law. 
VI. CERCLA AND RULE 17(b): SIX CASES 
A. Defendants' Capacity Found Under State Law 
In United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical 
CO.,159 the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Missouri followed Rule 17(b) and looked to state law to determine 
whether the defendant, NEPACCO, retained sufficient capacity to 
be sued for response costs under CERCLA.160 NEPACCO, incor-
porated in Delaware, had ceased to do business in 1972, had liqui-
dated its assets in 1974, and in 1976 had forfeited its charter for 
failing to name an agent to receive service of process. 161 The gov-
ernment brought its action against NEPACCO in 1980,162 outside 
the three-year winding-up period provided for by Delaware law. l63 
Nevertheless, both the district court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit held that NEP ACCO was not dead but "in a state 
of coma, "164 because the corporation had failed to file a certificate of 
voluntary dissolution with the state. 165 
Similarly, the United States District Court in Massachusetts, in 
In Re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor Proceedings,l66 found 
sufficient basis under Massachusetts corporate law to revive a dis-
solved corporation for purposes of a CERCLA suit. Defendant Belle-
ville Industries, a PCB manufacturer, was revived under Massachu-
159 United States v. Northeastern Pharm. and Chern. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823 (W.D. Mo. 
1984), a/I'd, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cen. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987). 
160 Id. at 827 n.l. 
161 810 F.2d at 746. 
162Id. 
163 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 278 (1983 & Supp. 1988). 
164 810 F.2d at 746. 
165 Id. 
166 675 F. Supp. 22 (D. Mass. 1987). 
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setts law167 to resolve a dispute over the sale of its assets, one month 
short of the expiration of Massachusetts' three-year winding-up pe-
riod. 168 As a revived corporation, Belleville continued to exist while 
this dispute was being resolved. 169 The federal government brought 
suit against Belleville under CERCLA while Belleville was re-
vived. 170 Belleville sought to dismiss this suit, arguing that the three-
year winding-up period had expired, and therefore that the CER-
CLA suit should be barred.l7l The district court rejected this argu-
ment, finding that Massachusetts' revival statute and survival stat-
ute operate independently.172 Under Massachusetts law, therefore, 
either the Secretary of State or the court173 retains the power to 
prolong corporate existence beyond the three-year winding-up pe-
riod for purposes of suit under CERCLA. 
Two other courts that have addressed CERCLA liability of dis-
solved corporations also have followed Rule 17(b) and applied state 
law. NEPACCO was again a CERCLA defendant in Missouri v. 
Bliss.174 In ruling on a motion to quash service, the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri rejected the 
claims of NEPACCO, which had incorporated in Delaware, that the 
applicable law was that of Missouri. 175 The court also held that, under 
Delaware law, NEPACCO retained the capacity to be sued. 176 
In the most recent case to address this question, United States v. 
Moore,177 the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia likewise found corporate capacity under Virginia corpo-
rate law. 178 The defendant, Moor-Fite Corporation, dissolved in 1985. 
167 [d. at 38. The Massachusetts revival statute allows the State Secretary to revive a 
dissolved corporation subject to such terms and conditions "as the public interest may require." 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B § 108 (West 1970). Section 104 of Chapter 156B also allows 
the court to appoint receivers with the power to prosecute and defend suits. These powers 
and "the existence of the corporation may be continued as long as the court finds necessary." 
[d. § 104. 
168 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 102 (West Supp. 1986). 
169 See 675 F. Supp. at 38. 
170 [d. 
171 [d. 
172 [d. at 40. This court concluded that the survival statute did not impose a limitation upon 
the power of the state to revive a dissolved corporation under the survival statute. 
173 See supra note 167. 
174 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1978 (E.D. Mo. 1985). 
175 [d. at 1982. For a discussion of door-closing statutes, see supra note 83. 
176 Bliss, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1982. 
177 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1796 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
178 [d. at 1799. 
882 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:855 
Virginia law provided for unending liability for pre-dissolution 
claims. 179 Because the government brought suit for CERCLA vio-
lations that allegedly occurred in 1983, the motion to quash service 
was denied. 180 
Thus, in four CERCLA cases, courts have found that the appli-
cable state law continued corporate capacity and liability, thereby 
avoiding the question of whether CERCLA overrides Rule 17(b) or 
preempts state corporate law on dissolution. In two other CERCLA 
cases, in which the application of state law precluded a finding of 
capacity, the courts were forced to resolve the conflict, and they 
came to opposite conclusions on both Rule 17(b) and preemption. 
B. Levin Metals v. Parr Richmond Terminal Corp. 
In Levin Metals v. Parr Richmond Terminal COrp.,181 the Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied Rule 17(b), looked to Cali-
fornia corporate law, and held that a CERCLA action was barred 
against a dissolved corporation. From 1947 to 1981, Parr Industrial, 
and later Parr Richmond Terminal Corporation, had manufactured, 
stored, and distributed fertilizers, herbicides, pesticides, and scrap 
metals on property in Richmond, California. 182 These operations re-
sulted in the release of hazardous substances that contaminated the 
property. 183 
Parr Industrial voluntarily dissolved in 1971 and sold the property 
to Parr Richmond Terminal Corporation. l84 Levin Metals Corpora-
tion purchased the property in 1981 from Parr Richmond Terminal 
Corporation. l85 Soon thereafter, hazardous wastes were discovered 
on the property. In 1984, Levin Metals brought a state claim of fraud 
against the defunct Parr Industrial, through its two major share-
holders and its successor, Parr Richmond Terminal Corporation. 186 
In 1985, Levin Metals, which was being sued by the federal govern-
ment for response costs under CERCLA as the owner of the con-
taminated property, also brought an action for damages and declar-
atory relief under CERCLA against both defendants. 187 
179 [d. 
180 [d. 
181 817 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1987). 
182 [d. at 1449. 
183 [d. 
184 [d. 
185 608 F. Supp. 1272, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (related case). 
186 [d. 
187 817 F.2d at 1449. 
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Parr Industrial sought to have the suit dismissed, claiming that, 
under California law, a dissolved corporation could not be sued for 
a cause of action arising after its dissolution. l88 The district court 
agreed, holding that Parr Industrial could not be sued because CER-
CLA was not passed until 1980, nine years after Parr Industrial had 
dissolved, and because no cause of action arose until Levin Metals 
actually incurred clean-up costS. 189 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, holding 
that, under Rule 17(b), California corporate law governed whether 
Parr Industrial had the capacity to be sued under CERCLA.I90 The 
court adopted the district court's reasoning, finding that, although 
CERCLA imposed liability for pre-dissolution activities, CERCLA's 
cause of action did not arise until after the statute was passed, and 
therefore did not arise until after Parr Industrial had dissolved. 191 
Because it held that Parr Industrial could not be sued, the court did 
not reach the issue of whether Levin Metals had to incur clean-up 
costs before its cause of action arose. 192 
In response to the defendant's arguments, Levin Metals contended 
that Rule 17(b) effectively allowed California law to defeat assertion 
of an important federal right and thus CERCLA should trump both 
Rule 17(b) and state corporate law. 193 Levin Metals argued that, if 
Rule 17(b) were followed, application of California law would impede 
and obstruct the basic purposes of CERCLA.I94 Therefore, it con-
cluded, California law should be preempted. 195 
The Ninth Circuit Court rejected these arguments, stating that 
there was no previous authority for superseding 17(b) in CERCLA 
actions and, more pointedly, that capacity to be sued and liability 
were two distinct legal concepts. l96 According to the court, although 
CERCLA might preempt state liability statutes, California corpo-
rate law defines capacity, not liability, and therefore state law was 
not preempted. The court stated that Levin Metals' preemption 
argument would serve to override Rule 17(b) any time a federal 
188 ld. 
189 631 F. Supp. 303, 303-04 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 





195 ld. at 1449-50. 
196 ld. The court implied that, while CERCLA addressed standards of liability, it did not 
address more general legal issues regarding the ability of a party to maintain or defend an 
action in federal court. 
884 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:855 
claim was presented. 197 The Ninth Circuit thus recognized capacity 
to be sued as a fundamental concept of state corporate law. CER-
CLA's policy objectives, although broad, did not support an abro-
gation of Rule 17(b), absent explicit congressional direction. 
C. United States v. Sharon Steel Corp. 
The United States District Court for the Central District of Utah 
explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit Court's Levin Metals holding. 
In United States v. Sharon Steel COrp,198 the court, ruling on a 
motion to dismiss,199 found that Congress intended CERCLA to 
supersede Rule 17(b), and thus, that state law governing dissolved 
corporations did not bar a CERCLA action. 200 
In 1986, the federal government brought a CERCLA action 
against Sharon Steel Corporation, UV Industries, Inc. (UV), and 
UV Industries Liquidating Trust (the Trust) to clean up a hazardous 
waste site. The property, located in Midvale, Utah, contained wastes 
left from the storage of milling and smelting tailings. 201 In November, 
1979, UV, the owner of the site, liquidated and sold its assets and 
properties to Sharon Steel Corporation for over $517 million. 202 Four 
months later, UV filed articles of dissolution in Maine, its state of 
incorporation. 203 It then placed the proceeds from the sale of its 
assets in a trust for distribution to stockholders.204 Maine's survival 
statute dictated that a corporation is subject to suit for pre-disso-
lution claims for up to two years after dissolution. 205 The federal 
government brought its suit against the defendants in October, 1986, 
five and a half years after UV dissolved and three and a half years 
after the winding-up period had expired. 206 
197 [d. 
198 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987). 
199 The district court has not reached a final decision in this case. Defendant UV Liquidating 
Trust's motion for immediate Appeals Court review has been denied. As this Comment went 
to print, District Court Judge Jenkins was reviewing the Trust's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment. 
200 Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
201 [d. at 1493. 
202 Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion of Defendant UV Industries, Inc. Liq-
uidating Trust to Dismiss the Complaint at 5, 681 F. Supp. 1492 (D. Utah 1987) (No. 86-C-
924J). 
203 Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1493. 
204 [d. at 1494. 
205 [d. (quoting Maine's survival statute). 
206 [d. at 1493. 
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None of the parties argued that CERCLA superseded Rule 17(b) 
or preempted state corporate law. On behalf of the dissolved cor-
poration, the Trust argued that under Rule 17(b) it was only subject 
to Maine law.207 The federal government argued that UV Industries 
was subject to Utah law, which provided that a corporation doing 
business within its borders was subject to suit even after dissolution, 
as long as its assets had not yet been distributed. 208 The government 
also argued that even under Maine law UV Industries was liable 
because Maine courts would not enforce Maine's survival statute in 
light of the overriding public policy expressed in CERCLA.209 De-
fendant Sharon Steel argued that UV Industries was subject to suit 
because a state survival statute, like a statute of limitations, could 
not operate to bar a claim brought by the United States. 210 
In ruling for the government, the district court did not adopt the 
government's arguments but instead devised its own reasons for 
rejecting the Trust's motion. Relying on Gustin-Bacon, the court 
found clear congressional intent in CERCLA's "notwithstanding" 
provision to supersede a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 211 The 
court also found that CERCLA preempted state law because the 
operation of state dissolution laws would stand as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes of the statute. 212 
The court also expressly disagreed with the Ninth Circuit Court's 
distinction in Levin Metals between liability and capacity. Calling it 
a "distinction without a difference,"213 the court reasoned instead 
that, by merging the concepts of capacity and liability, a state could 
simply reduce or eliminate corporate liability by limiting its capacity 
to be sued. 214 Whether direct or indirect, state corporate law would 
prevent CERCLA defendants from being held liable for the cost of 
a cleanup, a result that would frustrate the purpose of the statute. 
The court also dismissed the Ninth Circuit Court's fear that merging 
liability and capacity would result in an override of Rule 17(b) every 
time a federal right was asserted.215 The Sharon Steel court reasoned 
that preemption would occur only when Congress expressed the 
207 The Trust has stipulated to its own capacity, but has argued that it has not assumed the 
liability of UV Industries, and is not independently liable under CERCLA. Id. at 1494. 
208 Id. 
2091d. at 1495. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 1495-98. 
212 I d. at 1498. 
2131d. at 1497. 
2141d. 
215 Levin Metals, 817 F.2d 1448, 1451 (9th Cir. 1987). 
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clear intent to supersede state capacity provisions required under 
Gustin-Bacon,216 as the court found in CERCLA.217 
VII. RESOLVING THE CONFLICT BETWEEN LEVIN METALS AND 
SHARON STEEL 
Levin Metals and Sharon Steel stand in sharp contrast to one 
another on both congressional intent to supersede Rule 17(b) in 
enacting CERCLA's "notwithstanding" language and CERCLA's 
preemption of state corporate law. Although the Sharon Steel hold-
ing is desirable from an environmental perspective-that assets 
gained at the expense of the environment be used to rectify the 
damage-on both of these issues, the weight of the legal authority 
supports Levin Metals and not Sharon Steel. 
A. Congressional Intent to Supersede Rule 17(b) 
Regarding Rule 17(b), the Sharon Steel court assumed that Con-
gress has plenary power to supersede any of the federal rules, 
relying on Gustin-Bacon.218 When applied to a conflict between CER-
CLA and Rule 17(b), however, Gustin-Bacon's requirement of "clear 
intent, express or otherwise"219 is not met. Although the statute 
provides liability "notwithstanding any other provision or rule of 
law," CERCLA is silent on the applicability of the federal rules as 
a whole, and on 17(b) in particular. Congress expressed no clear 
intent regarding corporate capacity to be sued in the statute itself. 
The legislative history of CERCLA is also silent on the issue of 
corporate capacity to be sued. Moreover, the legislative history re-
garding the "notwithstanding" language indicates that Congress in-
tended to preclude defenses based on due care, not all procedural 
and equitable defenses. 22o In light of the long-standing deference to 
state law on the capacity of a dissolved corporation, and congres-
sional intent to let "traditional and evolving principles of common 
law"221 govern CERCLA liability, Congress did not address the 
conflict between the statute and the rule sufficiently to indicate its 
clear intent. Furthermore, under traditional rules of statutory con-
struction, Congress is presumed to know the state of the law, in-
216 See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text. 
217 Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
218Id. at 1495. 
219 See supra notes 91-103 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text. 
221 126 CONGo REC. S14,964 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph). 
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cluding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when it drafted CER-
CLA. Had Congress intended to supersede Rule 17(b) on corporate 
capacity-an unprecedented move--one can also presume that it 
would have done so with more specific language than "notwithstand-
ing any other provision or rule of law. "222 
Judicial interpretations of CERCLA's liability provisions in light 
of other procedural or equitable defenses also undercut the argument 
that Congress intended to supersede Rule 17(b). The majority of 
courts facing these defenses have held that, despite the seemingly 
conclusive language of section 107, defendants may still raise equi-
table defenses.223 Although some courts have rejected equitable de-
fenses, these holdings may be limited to particular defenses raised: 
attempts to enlarge the statutory defenses enumerated in section 
107(b) or to apply procedural requirements found in other sections 
of CERCLA. 224 Similarly, the courts that have addressed procedural 
defenses based on the federal rules have not found clear intent in 
the "notwithstanding" language to override the rules. 225 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court's reasoning in Levin Metals is 
persuasive. 226 Carried to its logical extreme, reading clear intent to 
supersede all non-statutory defenses into CERCLA's broad language 
and legislative history leads one to conclude that Congress intended 
to supersede all of the rules of civil procedure or judicial doctrines 
of res judicata or accord and satisfaction, whenever they frustrate 
the imposition of liability under CERCLA.227 
Courts' policy-balancing approach in cases concerning a prisoner's 
capacity to sue228 provides some support for the finding that CER-
CLA supersedes Rule 17(b). On one hand, Congress clearly ex-
pressed its intent that those responsible for contributing hazardous 
waste be responsible for its cleanup, and therefore the government 
has a strong interest in being able to reach the assets of corporate 
violators. Whether undistributed or in the hands of shareholders, a 
dissolved corporation's assets should still be available to pay for the 
cost of a CERCLA cleanup. A state's traditional power to create, 
222 The Sharon Steel court opined that if Congress had intended CERCLA to reach only 
existing corporations, it could have done so expressly, reversing the traditional statutory 
construction presumption of congressional knowledge. 681 F. Supp. at 1496 n.8. 
223 See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text. 
224 See supra notes 49--59 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra notes 31--39 and accompanying text. 
226 Levin Metals, 817 F.2d at 1451. 
227 See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 600 F. Supp. 1049, 1057--59 (D. Ariz. 1984). 
228 See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
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regulate, and dissolve corporations, while long-held, may not be 
sufficient to thwart a federal statute designed to protect public health 
and the environment from hazardous waste. From a policy perspec-
tive, therefore, the balancing approach supports the argument that 
CERCLA supersedes Rule 17(b). 
Unfortunately, from a legal perspective, the analogy between a 
prisoner's right to sue for civil rights claims and the government's 
right to sue under CERCLA is not strong enough to firmly establish 
CERCLA liability for dissolved corporations. This type of non-con-
stitutional policy-balancing is more appropriate for Congress than 
the courts. Further, even when presented with constitutional claims, 
not all federal courts have adopted the balancing approach, and thus 
state law on individual capacity to sue has prevented a prisoner from 
raising constitutional claims. 229 Because some courts have found that 
the protection of constitutional rights does not override Rule 17(b),230 
it is less likely that courts will find that CERCLA's policy objectives 
override the state's interests. 
Should a court adopt the balancing approach, it may hold that 
CERCLA's strong policy objectives still do not weigh as heavily as 
the protection of constitutional rights. On the other side of the 
balance, a state's interest in determining the terms of corporate 
existence may be found more compelling than its interest in pre-
venting prisoners from suing, in light of the traditional and extensive 
role that state law has played in regulating corporate behavior. 231 
Contrary to the court's view in Sharon Steel, therefore, Congress 
did not express the clear intent required under the Gustin-Bacon 
test to supersede Rule 17(b). The policy-balancing test, not part of 
the Sharon Steel analysis, also fails as a basis for finding an override 
of 17(b), due to its limited application. 
B. CERCLA Preemption of State Law 
The Sharon Steel and Levin Metals courts also disagreed on 
whether CERCLA preempted state law, although neither opinion 
sets out a rigorous analysis of the problem under the three preemp-
tion tests. The Sharon Steel court simply concluded that state dis-
solution law stood as "an obstacle to the accomplishment and exec-
ution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," because a 
state could always limit a corporation's liability by eliminating its 
229 See Lombardi v. Peace, 259 F. Supp. 222, 226 (S.D.N. Y. 1966). 
230 See id. 
231 See supra notes 76-81 and notes 124-26 and accompanying text. 
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capacity to be sued. 232 The Levin Metals court stated that CERCLA 
did not preempt state law because state law governed capacity to 
be sued, not liability.233 
The Levin Metals court correctly rejected an application of the 
third preemption "obstacle" analysis. As the court noted, under an 
"obstacle" preemption analysis, Rule 17(b) would be inoperative in 
any case involving a federal question because a dissolved corpora-
tion's lack of capacity to be sued would always stand as an obstacle 
to the enforcement of federal law. 234 The Sharon Steel court implicitly 
acknowledged this analytical flaw when it stated that preemption 
would only be found where Congress "clearly expresses" its intention 
to supersede state law; in short, a reexpression of the Gustin-Bacon 
test. 235 
The distinction between the Gustin-Bacon test and the preemption 
"obstacle" test is subtle but important. The preemption analysis 
establishes that state law may be preempted despite a lack of clear 
congressional intent. Although this is an appropriate standard when 
evaluating clashes between federal and state statutes, it is inappro-
priate when resolving a clash between a federal statute and other 
federal statutes, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that 
are expressions of congressional intent as well. 
Moreover, Rule 17(b) reflects a long tradition of state control over 
corporate dissolution and capacity to be sued. Oklahoma Natural 
Gas,236 Chicago Title,237 and their progeny238 clearly establish that 
corporations are creatures of state law. Under Rule 17(b), corpora-
tions' expectations about certainty and definiteness based on state 
law have been settled over a long period of time.239 Other than 
Sharon Steel, courts consistently have viewed Rule 17(b) as opera-
tive in federal question cases. 240 Any radical alteration of this doc-
trine requires a clear expression of congressional intent. 
Despite its correct legal analysis, the Levin Metals holding, and 
the lack of clear congressional intent in CERCLA itself, result in 
poor environmental policy. Application of state law encourages cor-
232 681 F. Supp. 1492, 1497 (D. Utah 1987) (quoting Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. 
Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469 (1984». 
233 Levin Metals, 817 F.2d at 1451. 
234 [d. 
235 Sharon Steel, 681 F. Supp. at 1498. 
236 Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257 (1927). 
237 Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 
(1937). 
238 See cases cited at supra note 82. 
239 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
240 See cases cited at supra note 82. 
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porations with CERCLA liability, in states with short winding-up 
periods, to dissolve with the hope that the federal government will 
not bring suit within the state survival period. A corporation, faced 
with the prospect of CERCLA liability, may very well commit cor-
porate suicide rather than pay the extensive costs of CERCLA 
cleanups. 
Because of the paramount interest in environmental safety and 
public health, Congress should therefore amend CERCLA to provide 
for continued capacity of a dissolved corporation to be sued. Another 
commentator on the question of CERCLA liability of dissolved cor-
porations has argued that CERCLA preempts state dissolution law 
but also has proposed a legislative amendment that would impose 
liability on corporations that dissolved prior to CERCLA's enact-
ment in 1980.241 The commentator also argues that CERCLA liability 
should be extended to shareholders once corporate assets have been 
distributed to the amount received in distribution.242 Although this 
author disagrees with the conclusion that preemption is the appro-
priate method of analysis, the proposed legislative solution strikes 
an appropriate balance between CERCLA's goals and corporate and 
shareholder expectations. Corporations that dissolved after CER-
CLA was enacted in 1980 were on sufficient notice of potential 
liability to justify an extension of liability. 
Additionally, Congress should limit dissolved corporation liability 
to claims brought by the federal government. The federal govern-
ment's interest in the CERCLA trust fund243 underlies the justifi-
cation for an unprecedented intrusion into a traditional area of state 
control. Because non-government plaintiffs seek restitution for their 
own costs, not for the expenditure of trust funds, Congress should 
tailor this extension of corporate capacity to governmental claims. 
In addition, the amendment should expressly limit the corporate 
"resuscitation" to defending only CERCLA claims. Non-CERCLA 
claims by other plaintiffs should be barred, although the corporation 
has been revived, to reduce the impact on the corporation's interests 
of certainty and definiteness. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b) directs a federal court to 
apply state corporate law to determine whether a dissolved corpo-
241 Note, supra note 110, at 163-64. 
242Id. at 167. 
243 See supra notes 9 and 27. 
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ration has the capacity to be sued. Because many state dissolution 
laws allow a corporation to end its existence, and its capacity to be 
sued, within two years after dissolution, some plaintiffs with oth-
erwise-valid claims against dissolved corporations cannot be com-
pensated. 
In CERCLA actions, this plaintiff is the federal government. One 
of CERCLA's primary policy objectives, to make those responsible 
for hazardous waste problems pay for their cleanup, is therefore 
thwarted by the application of Rule 17(b). As it presently stands, 
however, CERCLA does not contain the requisite clear congres-
sional intent to override Rule 17(b). CERCLA's liability language, 
though broad, was aimed primarily at eliminating defenses based on 
due care. An examination of the statute and its legislative history 
reveal no congressional consideration of potential CERCLA conflicts 
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Moreover, a majority of 
federal courts have continued to allow CERCLA defendants to raise 
procedural and equitable defenses despite the statute's broad lan-
guage. 
Congress, therefore, should amend CERCLA to extend a dis-
solved corporation's capacity to be sued for CERCLA violations. 
The overriding interest in the protection of public health and safety 
expressed in CERCLA justify a limited abrogation of this tradition. 
